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Bio-pharma: A financialized business model 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we construct a complementary financialized business model of SME 
bio-pharma that reveals how the product innovation and development process 
conjoins with speculative forces in capital markets. To conceptualise this descriptive 
business model we employ three organising elements: narratives about pipeline 
progress that may (or may not) lead to additional funding from equity investors or 
other investing partners, capital market conditions that impact on the supply of 
funding and market valuations and the variable motivations of equity investors who 
are not in a development marathon but a relay race anxious to pass on ownership and 
extract higher returns on invested capital through realised market value. Bio-pharmas 
are, in effect, constituted as investment portfolios of innovations where products in 
pipeline and firms trade for shareholder value. In this speculative innovation, capital 
market liquidity business model complementary narratives and favourable capital 
market conditions are required to keep it all going. 
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Bio-pharma: A financialized business model 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Investment in the creation of knowledge based assets through innovation and a high 
level of R&D spending is generally viewed as the key to maintaining relative 
corporate and national competitiveness, often summarised as closing the ‘innovation 
gap’. The critical literature on financialization is concerned with how the demands of 
the capital market modify strategic priorities and corporate governance in an era of 
shareholder value creation where management and shareholder interests align (Froud 
et al., 2003; Andersson et al., 2007; Lazonick, 2008). This literature exposes tensions 
and contradictions between the ‘expectation’ that innovation can transform corporate, 
industry and national economic performance, and ‘outcomes’ that tend to be more 
disappointing.  Lazonick (2008) argues that in a financialized economy the short-run 
priorities of the capital market hold sway over productive and financial transformation 
because firms are encouraged to maximize their short-run returns to shareholders 
rather than re-invest in innovative new product development for future 
competitiveness. Froud et al., (2006) are concerned with how, in a financialized 
economy, the role of management becomes that of structuring narratives that flatter 
the outcomes of R&D spending to maintain the confidence of analysts and investors, 
and thus improve market valuations of firms’ equity on the stock market in the 
absence of financial transformation.  
 
Lazonick and Tulum (2008) develop their general financialized account of ‘downsize 
and distribute’ more specifically in their paper on the US Bio-pharma (BP) industry. 
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“Since the 1980s the US business community, the BP industry included, has 
embraced the ideology that the performance of their companies and the 
economy are best served by the ‘maximization of shareholder value’…”  
 
“It is an ideology that, among other things, says that any attempt by the 
government to interfere in the allocation of resources can only undermine 
economic performance. In practice, what shareholder ideology has meant for 
corporate resource allocation is that when companies reap more profits they 
spend a substantial proportion of them on stock repurchases in an effort to 
boost their stock prices, thus enriching first and foremost the corporate 
executives who make these allocative decisions” (p.4). 
 
Froud et al., (2006), in their case study of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) observe that the 
pharma business model has less to do with R&D and product innovation and more to 
do with defensive mergers, corporate restructuring and narratives promising research 
productivity that ‘has not yet come through in the numbers’ (p.11). Gleadle & 
Haslam, (2010) note that narratives, in an R&D intensive medical diagnostics firm, 
are concerned with how R&D ‘must pay for itself’ and generate a return on 
investment to support analyst opinions about the share price. 
 
The objective of this paper is to construct an alternative but complementary 
financialized account of the bio-pharma business model. Our alternative account 
departs both from productionist understandings of the potential of R&D and the 
perspective of Froud et al (2006). Specifically, we argue that bio-pharma is an 
industry dependent on the capital market for funding because it is cash hungry until, 
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and if, products in pipeline1 become commercially viable and generate positive cash 
flow from revenues. The productive phases of drug development run from conception, 
laboratory stage, clinical development, patient testing (phases I to III) towards final 
regulatory approval. In this business model, R&D spending (expensed or capitalized) 
is deployed to meet agreed milestones, for example, completing development, 
obtaining results from patient clinical testing and submitting a product for regulatory 
approval and possible commercialisation. Favourable milestone reports about product 
in pipeline will help increase the chances of securing additional funding which may 
be crucial not only for continued survival but also positively influencing analysts’ 
opinions about stock market valuation for equity investors and incidentally helping to 
boost executive bonuses tied to the value of stock options. These options are more 
likely to be ‘in the money’ if a drug’s development does progress from one phase to 
the next and towards final regulatory approval for the market. Positive milestone 
reports move products along the pipeline towards regulatory approval reducing the 
risk of failure and mitigating investor losses on their equity investments.  
 
Milestone reports are also (but not always) opportunities for a firm’s existing 
investors to exit and new investors to enter because market values tend to adjust 
favourably after milestone announcements creating better conditions for buy and sell 
side transactions to be executed. As a result, individual investors tend to focus on 
different pipeline phases for their portfolio investments. Venture capital investors, for 
example, can exit via an initial placement offer (IPO), which results in a public listing 
on the stock market or they may sell on to a partner, such as a Big-Pharma2 or a 
                                                 
1 Pipeline here refers to how pharma products progress from laboratory into clinical development and 
testing (known as Phases I, II to III) towards final regulatory approval and commercialization.  
2 By Big-Pharma, we mean the international pharmaceutical giants such as Pfizer, Merck and GSK. 
This is in direct contrast to much smaller bio-pharma companies, the focus of this paper. 
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private equity partnership seeking a potential return on investment. In this 
financialized business model, the investor is not participating in a marathon but 
instead, competing in a relay where handing the baton on to the next investor secures 
a (possible) realised gain on invested equity funds. Bio-pharma investment is a 
speculative bet on scientific discoveries and is similar, in this respect to oil, gas and 
mineral exploration where Federal Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory approval is 
like striking oil or finding the seam. 
 
In this paper we employ an innovation, capital market liquidity conceptual framework 
to organize our understanding of the Financialized bio-pharma business model. This 
conceptual framework emphasises how complementary narratives about pipeline 
progress conjoin with capital market conditions and demands. Favourable milestone 
reports coupled with capital market liquidity help to inflate analyst’s expectations 
about market valuations and promote entry and exit opportunities for equity investors 
looking to extract a positive return on speculative investment. We explore the 
operation of this financialized business model in three UK small, medium enterprise 
(SME) bio-pharmas.  
 
2. Constructing a financialized bio-pharma business model 
 
Both government policy documents and the academic literature identify the potential 
of the creative and innovative sectors to transform economic growth and national 
competitiveness. (Porter, 1990; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991; DCMS 1998, 
2001; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2003; Mazzucato & Dosi, 2006; 
Lazonick, 2008). The general argument is that productive investment in innovation 
 7
can strengthen corporate financial performance and thus transform industry and 
national economic competitiveness. Investment in knowledge development and 
commitment to high levels of R&D spending are essential to maintaining 
competitiveness and closing the ‘innovation-gap.’ 
 
“Investment in research, leading to innovation and productive benefit to the 
economy, is a major concern for governments around the world, and a high 
priority for the European Union. Currently, the EU has considerable strengths, 
yet invests about a third less than the US and the innovation-capital market 
gap has not narrowed in recent years”. 
http://www.eirma.org/f3/showthread.php?t=613 
 
Against this background, more generally a central objective of UK industrial policy is 
to support the development and sustainability of creative knowledge intensive small 
and medium enterprise (SME) industry sectors to promote long-term economic 
growth and competitiveness. 
  
“This country’s success ultimately depends on a strong skills base and 
dynamic R&D both driving an innovative and competitive economy.” 
 
Lord Paul Drayson, Minister of State for Science and Innovation-capital 
market [May 2009] 
http://www.innovation-capital market.gov.uk/rd_scoreboard/?p=1 
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An earlier House of Commons report (HC 87 2002-3 UK Bio-pharmacology Industry) 
observed that:  
“Red (pharmaceutical) bio-pharmacology is a prime example of the sort of 
knowledge-driven industry that the government has been so keen to encourage 
and the lessons drawn here will be relevant to other high-technology industries 
making products with long gestation periods” (p.5). 
 
Over the last thirty years, global bio-pharma has attracted more than $300 billion in 
capital funds (Pisano, 2006a) into a science based business model. This business 
model according to Pisano(2006b, p.116), is epitomised by Genentech established in 
1976 to exploit recombinant DNA technology, a technique for engineering cells to 
produce human proteins. Genentech, Pisano observes, was a business model for 
monetizing intellectual property (IP) that has shaped the bio-pharma industry in three 
inter-related ways. Firstly, technology transfer from universities to the private sector 
takes place through the creation of new entities, rather than by selling directly to 
existing companies. Secondly, venture capital and private equity investors provide 
funding and management support at critical phases and reward the founders 
(scientists, universities and seed-investors) for risks taken. Finally, a viable market for 
know-how is created in which newly established firms provide their IP to established 
companies in return for funding or exit to capital markets via an Initial Placement 
Offer (IPO), partnered or acquired by Big-Pharma firms like Merck, Pfizer and 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK).  
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The SME bio-pharma sector became an investment opportunity for venture capital 
and private equity investors because Big-Pharma ultimately needs to develop new 
products either in-house or procure products developed externally to replenish their 
pipelines as many existing products are coming out of patent.  Ernst and Young 
(2009) estimate that, for the period 2007 to 2012, $67bn of Big-Pharma revenue is 
vulnerable to price competition that arises when drugs lose patent protection (p. 3). 
Avis Bridgers (Nerac Analyst, 2009) observes that: 
 
“Large pharmaceutical companies seek that next successful business model 
which supports both scientific innovation and speed to market. The recent 
economic downturn has hastened these efforts. Dwindling development 
pipelines, increased regulatory pressures and spiralling healthcare costs have 
put extra strain on an old and once-successful corporate model that supported 
the development of blockbuster drugs. The emerging business model 
combines continued acquisition of smaller companies with constant 
reorganization of the parent, to preserve shareholder value and provide the 
flexibility to capitalize on rapidly-evolving science, global expansion of 
markets and changing regulations” (p.1).  
http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:bNHLXjol1C4J:www.nerac.com
/download.php%3Fid%3D175+bio+pharma+business+model&hl=en&gl=uk 
  
 
The SME bio-pharma business model has been further legitimised because Big-
Pharma has started to emulate small cash strapped bio-pharma companies and 
introduce a venture capital approach to their product portfolio and pipeline 
investment, Bloomberg columnist Trista Kelley observing: 
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“In July, Witty (GSK’s Chief Executive) began requiring drug-discovery 
divisions to compete for funding. He brought in an investment board that 
included venture capitalists and bio-pharmacology executives to review 
researchers’ proposed projects. The board applies three-year business plans to 
the scientific process, mimicking the do- or -die environment in small, cash-
strapped bio-pharmacology companies. Previously, a research unit’s funding 
wasn’t dependent on meeting deadlines and goals”. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=home&sid=apc
1eXm6xaGc 
 
 
In the 2008 annual report and accounts Andrew Witty (GSK’s) new chief executive, 
argued that large-scale acquisitions absorb too much organizational effort on 
integration at the expense of innovation and creativity. GSK is rebalancing its product 
portfolios to take advantage of new market opportunities offered by 
biopharmaceuticals. 
“During the year we rebalanced our Drug Discovery organisation to improve 
efficiency and focus on the areas of new science that we believe are most 
likely to lead to new medicines” (p.8). 
 
“Biopharmaceuticals will play an increasingly important role in our future 
portfolio. Offering a worldwide market of approximately £40 billion with 
projected compound annual growth of 18% over the next five years, 
biopharmaceuticals are compounds capable of being manufactured by living 
organisms, usually cultured cells” (p.8). 
http://www.gsk.com/investors/reps08/GSK-Report-2008-full.pdf 
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The SME bio-pharma sector has benefited from government funding into universities 
(McMillan et al., 2000) through knowledge transfer, company spin offs and R&D tax 
credits. In some cases, the commercial ventures established retain links to medical 
research centres and universities through a strategic alliance or else contractual 
arrangements that out-source the R&D work back to the university (Robinson and 
Stuart, 2001; Standing et al., 2008). Venture capital (VC) partnerships and private 
investors, sensing financial opportunity, have channelled significant funding into 
SME bio-pharma. Bio-pharmas that do manage their innovation process, to create 
new product from their technical platform(s) and either move towards or achieve 
regulatory approval, can increase the probability of leveraging returns on invested 
capital. This is because the perceived financial risk, and thus investors’ required 
return on investment, is reduced as milestones are met along the route to regulatory 
approval.   
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Fig 1: US Biotech R&D in Sales %
 
Source: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Beyond_borders_2009/$FILE/Beyond_
borders_2009.pdf 
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In the US, the bio-pharma industry (comprising 1754 firms) accounts for three 
quarters of the global bio-pharma industry by sales revenue and roughly eighty 
percent of total global R&D spend. This group of firms deploys roughly 40 percent of 
revenue into R&D although this has fallen from a high of over 60 percent in the late 
1990s (see fig.1). Although the average US bio-pharma firm is research-intensive, 
Ernst and Young (2009) observe that profit is elusive and that with the exit of 
Genentec, acquired by Roche in 2009, this sector is unlikely to be back in profit in the 
near future. 
“In 2008, the sector finally reached aggregate profitability with aggregate net 
income of US$0.4 billion. Alas, this accomplishment will likely turn out to be 
short-lived, given Roche’s acquisition of Genentech in 2009” (p.25). 
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Fig 2: US Biotech Net income in Sales 
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Source: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Beyond_borders_2009/$FILE/Beyond_
borders_2009.pdf 
 
During the period 2001 to 2007, the number of bio-pharma companies listed on the 
London Alternative Investment Market (AIM) increased from ten to over seventy (see 
fig 3) and at peak, the sector accounted for seven per cent of all AIM listed firms 
market value (see fig 4) 
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Fig 3
AIM Market : No of bio-pharma firms listing 
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Source: 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/aim/aim.htm 
Fig. 4
Market value of bio‐pharma relative to FTSE AIM
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Source: 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/aim/aim.htm 
 
It is possible to construct a ‘productionist’ business model of SME bio-pharma, one 
that places emphasis on the importance of R&D and innovation as part of a resource 
based view (RBV) of the firm where the object is to transform R&D spending and 
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acquired knowledge into unique intangible assets to enable an above average financial 
return. (Porter, 1990; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991; DCMS 1998, 2001; 
Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2003; Mazzucato & Dosi, 2006; 
Lazonick, 2008). In this productionist bio-pharma business model, the development of 
ethically approved drugs requires a combination of: technical ingenuity, financial 
resource and patient shareholder investment because product development takes place 
over decades not years (see Hopkins, 2007).  
 
Alternatively, it is possible to construct a complementary financialized business 
model of SME bio-pharma, one that emphasises the tension between innovative 
possibilities, cash burning firms, capital market liquidity and investors’ quest for 
realised shareholder return. Our bio-pharma financialized business model incorporates 
three organising elements: a] narratives about productive performance and how these 
act as a substitute for commercially driven financial numbers, b] capital market 
conditions and c] the variable identities and motivations of equity investors where the 
scope for arbitrage and financial gain from exit matters. 
 
In start-up SME bio-pharmas, narratives about productive achievement take on 
increased importance in the absence of commercially driven financial information 
about revenue, expenses and return on capital. These narratives relate to a specific 
drug development outcome, trial and patient test results communicated in the form of 
milestone reports.  Favourable reports might encourage equity investors to provide 
additional follow-on funding or result in payments from partners relating to milestone 
agreements. Positive narratives may also inflate analyst expectations about future cash 
funding and thus the market value of shareholder equity (see Newberry and Robb, 
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2008). It is very much a speculative business model where narratives about potential 
discovery operate as a substitute for actual discovery in setting stage payments and 
establishing the basis for market expectations and perception of market value.  
 
Capital market conditions matter especially with regard to maintaining the flow of 
follow-on equity funding into a financial value chain that is fragmented and the 
calculations and motivations of investors, variable. For example, there are complex 
trade off’s between raising additional follow-on equity funding and the dilution of 
existing equity stakes. The average bio-pharma firm is perhaps best viewed as a 
portfolio of products at various phases of development where a funding deal can 
attach to individual products or firms. Obtaining financial support for specific 
products in the pipeline may not underwrite firm-level financial stability if the 
investor’s strategy is to fund a portfolio of products at various stages of development, 
rather than to invest in a particular firm.  
 
If funding is complex and fragmented (see Fig 5), exit strategies for equity investors 
are also variable and depend on the extent to which investment is in the firm as a 
whole or attached to specific products. It may be more difficult to exit if the 
investment is in the firm rather than a specific product contract and is not helped if 
capital market liquidity and the market valuation of a firm’s equity deteriorate. 
Partnering agreements and payments linked to specific products may boost a firm’s 
market value but this may not be sufficient to encourage investor exit if realised 
market value is still below the value of the accumulated equity investment made in the 
firm. Capital market valuations are volatile and may either inflate or depress IPO 
funding, and put a brake on the supply of debt finance to private equity and hedge 
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funds that depend on leveraging holding gains on the market value of equity 
investment relative to debt finance. 
 
 
 
The bio-pharma innovation, capital market liquidity business model reveals the 
tension between the flow of funding, progress of product pipeline and the variable 
motivations of investors who are entering and exiting at various points along the 
product development value chain. Winners that invest in bio-pharma have lottery 
tickets stamped ‘FDA approved’. Equity analysts assume that final approval even at 
phase III offers at best a 50-60% chance for a bio-pharma (Ernst & Young, 2008) and 
that  
 
Concept Phases I       III  Out to Market 
VC funding/ 
Business 
Angel 
Investment banks, hedge funds, private equity 
partnerships, corporate partners 
Investors entering and exiting 
Product R
ange
Fig 5:  The financialized bio-pharma product development chain 
Source: Authors 
Funding Escalator 
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“the success rate of companies that are truly commercially successful and 
sustainable is well below 10%” (p.38).  
 
In the following section, we employ our innovation, capital market liquidity 
Financialized bio-pharma business model to explore failure and success in three 
SME’s: Ardana, Vernalis and Antisoma. 
 
 
3. Bio-pharma SME cases: illustrating the innovation, capital market liquidity, 
business model 
 
Of our three SME bio-pharmas, Ardana ceased trading in June 2008 going into 
administration, Vernalis downsized and restructured its business, backing a number of 
its products into partnerships to fund product in pipeline towards regulatory approval 
and Antisoma whilst carrying an accumulated deficit, is now running with a surplus as 
partnership milestone agreements start to pay off. Collectively our three firms 
reported accumulated loses of £684 million on equity investments of £767million and 
all have struggled to generate a positive return on invested capital for equity investors.  
 
3.1 Ardana: up for sale but no buyers 
The Board of Ardana has taken these steps after it became apparent that a 
possible refinancing or a possible sale or merger under discussion could not be 
completed within a timeframe during which the Board believed the Company 
would have sufficient cash reserves to continue trading. All discussions were 
terminated by the afternoon of Friday 27 June. 
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The Company has over recent months been in a number of licensing 
discussions for individual development products, however the Board have also 
concluded that these potential transactions could not be completed within the 
time available before exhaustion of the Company's cash resources. 
http://www.ardana.co.uk/ 
 
Ardana was floated on the London Stock Market at a price of 128p not the 153p 
expected by management in March 2005. The funding raised from the IPO 
utilised to finance the development and approval of a range of products for male 
reproduction, prostrate cancer and growth hormone deficiencies. Ardana had by 
2007 three products with regulatory approval: Emselex, Striant and Invicorp (see 
table 1). These products were sold and marketed in the UK and near European 
countries through joint distribution arrangements but this success did not 
translate straightforwardly into strong financial performance because revenues 
from distribution deals were negligible and the company was rapidly burning 
balance sheet cash reserves. 
 
Table 1: Ardana product pipeline 
Product Indication 
Phase 
I 
Phase 
II 
Phase 
III 
In 
market
Striant SR Male Hypogonadism     9 
Invicorp Non oral erectile dysfunction     9 
Emselex Over active bladder    9
Testo Cream Male Hypogonadism  9   
Oral GHS Endocrinology diagnostic 9    
Teverelix LA Prostrate cancer  9   
Teverelix LA BPH  9   
Teverleix LA Endometriosis 9    
Terbutaline Infertility  9   
Oral GHS Endocrinology therapeutic 9    
Testo Cream Female Indication 9    
Source: Annual Report, 2007, page 13. 
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Without additional follow-on funding in 2005 and 2006, the company would have run 
out of cash and analysts initially reacted positively to the additional funding marking-
up the share price. Beyond 2006, Ardana was slow to move product along the pipeline 
into phase III especially its Testo Cream product and analysts reacted negatively, 
marking down the market value of the company from £70 to £4 million. With the 
share price and stock market value tumbling, Ardana was not able to raise additional 
follow-on equity funds and progressively ran down balance sheet cash reserves. 
 
Table 2: Ardana financial data 2004 to 2007 
  Revenues EBITDA Cash Balances
Market 
value 
  £mill £mill £mill £mill 
2004 0.09 -15.5 11.1 2.1 
2005 0.08 -9.2 29.2 1.1 
2006 0.49 -8.8 19 70 
2007 0.26 -12.2 16.6 70 
2008       4 
Source: http://www.ardana.co.uk/reports.html 
 
In these circumstances, shareholders had few (if any) exit possibilities and in a 
desperate final move, Ardana advertised on its web site the following message: 
“Ardana prides itself on its flexible, focussed approach to creative deal making.”  
Ardana is also interested in co-developing strategic products with partners 
who bring supplementary resources and expertise to accelerate their 
development. Ardana is currently seeking either licensing or co-development 
partners for the products listed below.   
http://www.ardana.co.uk/ardanaoffer.html 
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Despite some interest, no buyers were forthcoming and the company continued on  its 
cash burn trajectory going into voluntary administration on June 27th 2008 with share 
capital valued at £4 million after £72 million of equity funding had been put into the 
company. 
 
3.2 Vernalis: Cash burn, downsizing and a last minute rescue package 
 
Venalis was formed in 2003 by the merger of British Biotech, Ribo Targets and 
Vernalis Group with one product approved and marketed (Frovatriptan) and a number 
of other products in pipeline for the treatment of strokes and Parkinson’s disease at 
phase II and phase I respectively. Both before and after its formation, Vernalis 
continued on to burn cash such that the accumulated value of equity funding of £609 
million more or less straightforwardly translated into accumulated operating losses 
amounting to £602 million in 2008. 
 
Table 3: Vernalis financial data 2003 to 2008 
 Revenues EBITDA Cash Balances Market value 
 £mill £mill £mil £mill 
2003 12.9 -30 24 83 
2004 15.2 2.9 33 137 
2005 14.1 -14 68 190 
2006 16.3 -30 37 196 
2007 19.8 -17 21 20 
2008 10.2 3.8 14.6 12 
Source: http://www.vernalis.com/ver/ic/ 
 
During the period 2003 to 2008, Vernalis’s net cash requirements were £85 million, 
supported by additional equity financing in the form of follow-on funding but in 2008, 
Vernalis (in partnership with ENDO) lost its FDA approval for Frova, a preventative 
menstrual migraine product. 
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To quote Vernalis executive chairman Peter Fellner: 
 
“It was clear that because we did not get Frova approved by FDA we had to 
make some radical changes. We had to reduce cash burn, which we have from 
£20m a year to less than £10m” (Jonathan Russell, Telegraph: 21 February 
2008) 
If the drug had been approved, Vernalis would have received a $40m (£20m) 
milestone payment from Endo Pharmaceuticals, its US partner. However, in a reversal 
of fortune, Vernalis now owed Endo $50m, paying $7 million in cash and agreeing to 
forego future royalties on US sales of Frovatriptan, and divesting product in pipeline 
to further slow its cash burn. 
Vernalis said it would seek to divest Apokyn, its drug for Parkinson's disease, 
and of its US commercial operations. Analysts said share price movement 
indicated Vernalis was a strong takeover target.  
(Marianne Barriaux, Guardian: 21 February 2008) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/feb/21/pharmaceuticals 
 
Table 4: Vernalis product pipeline end 2008 
Product Indication 
Phase 
I 
Phase 
II 
Phase 
III 
In 
market
Priority Programmes           
V3381 Neuropathic Pain 9       
V2006 Parkinson’s Disease   9     
V85546 
Inflammatory 
Disease 9       
NVP-AUY922 Cancer 9       
HSP990 Cancer 9       
V158866 Pain 9       
V158411 Cancer 9       
Progress through partnering           
V1512 Parkinson’s Disease   9     
V10153 Ischaemic stroke   9     
Source: http://www.vernalis.com/ver/av/ 
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The loss of FDA approval compounded already weak financial performance, 
accelerating defensive restructuring to limit cash burn but after a successful financing 
round in May 2009 the company revealed it now had sufficient cash resources to keep 
it going until March 2010. As at the end of 2009, the market value of the company 
was £20 million, down from a peak of £200 million in 2006 (see table 3) leaving 
investors with little in the way of exit options. Yet during 2009, Vernalis successfully 
negotiated two partnership agreements with Servier and GlaxoSmithKline to fund two 
products in pipeline towards regulatory approval.  
 
 
The deal is structured as a risk-sharing agreement, with Vernalis responsible 
for drug discovery activities and GSK for pre-clinical development. Upon IND 
filing, GSK will have the option to license all collaboration compounds and if 
this is exercised, will then be responsible for all future development and 
commercialisation activities. 
http://www.vernalis.com/ver/nc/latestreleases/releases2009/2009-08-
06a/2009-08-06a.pdf 
 
In the interim statement for June 2009, the Executive Chairman observed that: 
 
The Company ended the half year with £27.8 million in cash and has secured a 
further $7.5 million since the end of the period from Novartis and GSK. The 
Company is positioned well to continue rebuilding substantial shareholder 
value. 
http://www.vernalis.com/ver/nc/latestreleases/releases2009/2009-08-06/2009-
08-06.pdf 
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In response during 2009, the share price recovered and the market value of the firm’s 
equity reached £58 million in September 2009 improving exit options for equity 
shareholders. This market value represents just one-tenth of the overall accumulated 
investment made by equity investors in Vernalis and in 2008 annual report still 
revealed  twenty-eight risk factors that could still frustrate investor returns.  
 
3.3 Antisoma: towards a viable bio-pharma business model? 
 
Antisoma plc, founded in 1998, was first listed on the European Nasdaq market 
before transferring to the London Stock Exchange in 1999. The 2003 annual report 
and accounts reveal that the company has a number of treatment therapies at various 
stages of development for the treatment of cancer. The company discloses in its 2002 
annual report that the strategy is to search and acquire promising early stage products 
and take these through towards regulatory approval 
 
“Our ‘search-and-develop’ business model is based on acquiring promising 
early stage product candidates from academic and commercial institutions. We 
then add value to these agents by designing and implementing effective 
programmes for pre-clinical development and the initial phases of clinical 
development. As our product candidates progress to late-phase trials, we 
actively seek pharmaceutical industry partners to complete clinical 
development, file for regulatory approval and carry out marketing activities”. 
http://www.antisoma.com/asm/ir/reports/rep2002/2002ar/2002ar.pdf?t=popup 
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To finance acquisitions and progress product along the pipeline, Antisoma has 
regularly sought follow-on equity funding increasing issued share capital from 141 
million to 835 million shares to raise roughly £100 million of additional equity 
finance.  
 
Table 5: Antisoma product pipeline end 2008 
Product Indication 
Phase 
I 
Phase 
II 
Phase 
III 
In 
market
ASA404 Lung prostrate secondary cancer    9   
AS1413 Secondary Leukaemia    9   
Oral fludarabine Lymphocytic Leukaemia      9 
AS1411 Renal cancer  9     
AS1402 Breast cancer 9      
AS1409 Renal cancer 9      
P2045  Lung cancer 9      
        
 
Source: http://www.antisoma.com/asm/ir/reports/rep2002/2002ar/2002ar.pdf?t=popup 
 
In 2008, one product nearly ‘in market’, oral fludarabine, was awaiting FDA 
regulatory approval for use in the US market and was obtained as a result of the 
acquisition of Xanthus.  
 
Another important asset from the Xanthus portfolio is oral fludarabine. This is 
a tablet formulation of a widely used chemotherapy drug for CLL, which is 
currently only available in the US as an intravenous formulation. A marketing 
application for oral fludarabine is being considered by the FDA.  
http://www.antisoma.com/asm/ir/reports/rep2002/2002ar/2002ar.pdf?t=popup 
 
Antisoma continues to ‘search, acquire and develop’ new products for its pipeline 
where the objective is to limit R&D spending risk to equity investors, that is, avoiding 
investment in drug discovery but focusing instead on the development of promising 
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prospects. As product moves along the pipeline, it is then possible to back these into 
partnership agreements that tend to generate ‘lumpy’ and erratic revenue patterns 
when milestones are met (see table 6).  
 
Table 6: Antisoma financial data 2000 to 2008 
 Revenues EBITDA Cash Balances Market value 
 £mill £mill £mill £m 
2000 1.5 -8 4.4  
2001 3.3 -9.2 9.1  
2002 2.2 -12.7 18.9 78 
2003 11.8 -5.2 2.4 115 
2004 18.1 -2.7 16.4 58 
2005 6.2 -10.3 25 192 
2006 1.6 -19.4 14.9 123 
2007 7.9 -13.5 51.4 144 
2008 39.5 10.6 33.9 300 
Source: Annual reports, various years 
http://www.antisoma.com/asm/ir/reports/ 
  
 
Total revenues for the year ended 2008 were £39.5 million, compared with 
£8.0 million last year. The difference mainly results from the increase in 
revenues relating to recognition of the upfront and milestone payments 
received from Novartis. 
http://www.antisoma.com/asm/ir/reports/rep2008/ar2008/ar2008.pdf?t=popup 
 
As milestones agreements result in additional revenue, analysts revise their narratives 
about the share price. 
Antisoma, the cancer drug developer, took on 5 per cent to 31½p after analysts 
said a value gap had opened up against its peer group. 
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US oncology specialists have gained 89 per cent this year, compared with 
Antisoma's 38 per cent gain, PiperJaffray said. It saw the performance as 
anomalous given Antisoma's promising test data this year. (FT.Com 
September 18 2009) 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/edf336ba-a3ea-11de-9fed-00144feabdc0.html 
4. Summary  
The productionist bio-pharma business model describes a long-term financial 
commitment by equity investors because the R&D spending process is driven by 
scientific discovery and clinical testing and development takes place over decades. 
This productionist stereotype is used by policy makers and deployed by academics to 
describe innovation-led business models and how they might transform firm, industry 
and national competitiveness. The critical literature constructs an alternative 
financialized view where according to Lazonick (2008), in an era of shareholder 
value, there is a tendency for firms to downsize and distribute rather than sustain 
R&D investment in innovation for firm and national competitiveness. Froud et al 
(2006) in their financialized account of strategy at GSK argue that managerial 
narratives promoted the promise of transformation from R&D spending and helped to 
boost analysts’ short-run opinions about the share price. The financial numbers 
disclosed in GSK’s annual report and accounts are used by Froud et al to construct an 
alternative narrative about the lack of financial transformation and productivity from 
R&D spending in an era where strategy is directed towards value creation for 
shareholders.   
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this paper, we construct a descriptive financialized bio-pharma business model and 
utilise this to explore how narratives about innovation and the productive outcomes of 
R&D spend conjoin with capital market conditions and demands of equity investors. 
Our descriptive financialized bio-pharma business model is structured using three 
organising conceptual elements: narratives about performance, capital market 
conditions and the variable motivation of equity investors, where entry and exit 
possibilities matter.    
 
Narratives about pipeline progress are important in the absence of sensible financial 
information (Froud et al, 2006) because this helps secure refinancing and increase the 
probability of follow-on funding from equity investors and receipts from partnership 
agreements in the form of milestone payments. Narratives about milestone 
achievements are also communicated to investment analysts who make 
recommendations about the firms share price and hence market value. Capital market 
conditions now take on added significance both in terms of the supply of funding, 
liquidity and market valuation because this facilitates entry and exit for equity 
investors. The identity of investors involved along the product pipeline changes from 
the original academics/university spinout equity holders to venture capitalists, 
partnership firms, private equity funds or Big-Pharma. The motivations of equity 
investors are variable, involving investment in the firm or into individual products 
that are at various stages of development along the pipeline, complicating market 
valuations because contractual arrangements are fragmented and complex. 
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The financialized bio-pharma business model shares many of the characteristics of 
other highly speculative sectors and tellingly The Times on 24th January 2009 
observed that the biotech sector is that corner of the stock market that most closely 
resembles a casino. The chances of success of an early-stage drug are unpredictable 
and financial loss is the most likely outcome. Pisano (2006b, p.119) observes that this 
is due in no small part to the ‘profound and persistent uncertainty rooted in a limited 
knowledge of human biological systems and processes, mak(ing) drug R&D (a) 
highly risky’ process. The biotech business model that we describe in this article is a 
speculative innovation, capital market liquidity business model that depends on 
complementary narratives, capital market liquidity, risk appetite and appreciation of 
market values to facilitate entry and exit possibilities for equity investors to keep it all 
going. In contrast to more traditional productionist perspectives, we argue that this is 
not simply a business model capable of delivering productive transformation for the 
competitive economy.    
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